TPC-Journal-V4-Issue3

The Professional Counselor \Volume 4, Issue 3 194 committee recommended maintaining the system in the next iteration of the DSM and suggested that APA provide resources to support more widespread and consistent use (Probst, 2014). Nearly eight years later, the APA discontinued use of the multiaxial system, seemingly without public discussion or comment. Indeed, APA included just three paragraphs regarding this shift in the DSM-5 , noting that “despite widespread use and its adoption by certain insurance and governmental agencies, the multiaxial system in DSM-IV was not required to make a mental disorder diagnosis” (2013, p. 16). From Multiaxial to Nonaxial Assessment Clinicians who are accustomed to documenting diagnosis using a multiaxial system may wonder what DSM- 5 assessment and diagnosis will look like. APA provided little concrete guidance, stating, “DSM-5 has moved to a nonaxial documentation of diagnosis (formerly Axes I, II and III), with separate notations for important psychosocial and contextual factors (formerly Axis IV) and disability (formerly Axis V)” (2013, p. 16). In the following sections, we explore evidence related to the shift and identify implications for counselors. Medical and Mental Health Conditions (Axes I, II and III) Axes I, II and III have been eliminated in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013). Clinicians can simply list any disorders or conditions previously coded on these three Axes together and in order of clinical priority or focus (APA, 2013). Because many billing systems already used this system, this may not result in meaningful changes in terms of third-party billing. This change removes the distinction of previous clinical disorders, personality disorders and intellectual disability disorder. Over time, clinicians have questioned whether Axis II personality disorders were qualitatively different from or any more stable than Axis I clinical disorders (Røysamb et al., 2011); one might also argue that certain developmental disorders (e.g., autism spectrum disorder, previously coded on Axis I) are just as longstanding and pervasive as intellectual disability disorder. Although there is some evidence that personality disorders are distinct from other clinical disorders, emerging evidence indicates that mental disorders do not factor cleanly into these classifications (Røysamb et al., 2011). It is possible that this subtle shift in coding may decrease the stigma often associated with personality disorders. At the same time, this change in coding suggests that there is no differentiation between medical conditions and mental health disorders. Initially, APA released a definition in which it conceptualized mental disorders as “a behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual” and “reflects an underlying psychobiological dysfunction [emphasis added]” (APA, 2012). The resulting controversy and dialogue regarding lack of evidence for the claim led to a more balanced definition of mental disorder as involving “a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning” (APA, 2013, p. 20). Still, clinicians will find that the previous DSM-IV-TR phrase “general medical condition” has been replaced with “another medical condition” throughout the DSM-5 (e.g., APA, 2013, p. 161). Together, these reinforce an assumption that mental disorders are rooted in biological causes. Some have suggested that an increased emphasis on mental disorders as organic implies that environmental factors are less important, and this could reduce the stigma that many people with mental disorders feel (Yang, Wonpat-Borja, Opler, & Corcoran, 2010). Certainly, the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) includes evidence that some mental disorders have considerable genetic and neurological links, even if scientists have yet to identify clear laboratory markers for any DSM diagnosis (First, 2010). However, others have suggested that this approach could reinforce the notion that those with mental disorders are biologically flawed as opposed to being complex beings who traverse many complicated contextual factors that impact their functioning (Ben-Zeev, Young, & Corrigan, 2010).